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several shifts. However, the précise nature and timing of thèse earlier 
shifts is still open to question because of the data problems involved 
in splicing together three séries of unequal, uneven, and in some cases 
unknown, reliability. We restricted our analysis to post-1970 because 
we do not hâve much faith in the vacancy data which pre-dates Statistics 
Canada's Job Vacancy Survey. Second, we do not agrée with Professor 
Reid that the broken pipeline theory implies that the paradox is only 
a temporary phenomenon. The failure of a substantial portion of a whole 
cohort to obtain satisfactory employment and the reluctance of em-
ployers to take on inexperienced employées in industry for several 
years is likely to hâve lasting effects. It is now apparent that individuals' 
first expériences in the labour market exert a major shaping influence 
upon their subséquent employment motivation, job search, and work 
behaviour. The effects of several years of discouraged unemployment, 
under-employment, and job-hopping will be felt long after the economy 
recovers. 
DROIT DU TRAVAIL 
LABOUR ARBITRATION AND THE REFUSAL TO 
PERFORM HAZARDOUS WORK 
Ray SENTES 
The modem basis of Canada's collective bargaining System is the 
Order In Council No. 1003 passed by the fédéral government in 
February, 1944. The Order provided for a high degree of state inter-
vention. As H. D. Woods has noted in particular: 
« Looked at from the point of view of the right to strike, it becomes 
apparent that this instrument, as well as the lockout, was severely 
curtailed. In the broad classification of dispute areas, strikes formerly 
took place over issues involving jurisdiction between unions, récognition 
of unions by employers, negotiating new agreements or renegotiating 
old ones, and the interprétation or application of agreements in force. 
Strikes had now been rendered unlawful over jurisdictional issues, 
récognition issues, and application or interprétation issues.»1 
* SENTES, R., Research Director, International Association of Heat and Frost 
Insulators and Asbestos Workers, Local 126, Calgary. 
1
 H. D. WOODS, Labour Policy in Canada, second édition, P. 93. 
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Except where contract negotiation was concerned, compulsory arbi-
tration or some form of binding settlement replaced the right to strike. 
Union leaders of the day supported the législation.2 Following the war, 
most provinces passed législation modelled on P. C. 1003. Thus, arbi-
tration became an intégral part of Canadian industrial relations. 
Naturally, arbitrators adjudicating disputes hâve upheld the 'work 
now, grieve later' rule. For example: 
« Some men apparently think that, when a violation of a contract 
seems clear, the employée may refuse to obey and thus resort to self-
help rather than the grievance procédure. That is an erroneous point 
of view an industrial plant is not a debating society. Its object is 
production. When a controversy arises, production cannot wait for 
exhaustion of the grievance procédure. While that procédure is being 
pursued, production must go on. And someone must hâve the authority 
to direct the manner in which it is to go on until the controversy is 
settied. That authority is vested in supervision.» 
(Re USW and Lake Ontario Steel Company Ltd. (1968) 19 L.A.C. 103 
(Weiler) at p.p. 107-08 quoting from Ford Motor Co. 3L.A. 779) 
One exception to the above doctrine is where an employée 
refuses to perform a task which is hazardous to his health. In such 
cases the refusai to carry out an order does not necessarily provide 
grounds for disciplinary action by the employer. This right of refusai, 
is far from being absolute. 
« If an employée disobeys orders out of fear for the safety of 
himself or others, then he runs the risk that such a fear may be de-
termined not to hâve been justified in the circumstances. In such case, 
he would quite properly be disciplined for insubordination.» 
(Re. Int'l Chemical Workers, Local 721 and Brockville Chemicals Ltd., 
(1965) 16 L.A.C. 261 (Weatherill) at p. 265) 
What guidelines, then, are available to an employée wishing to 
exercise his right of refusai? An examination of reported arbitration 
cases reveals that certain criteria must be met if disciplinary action is 
to be avoided.3 
The first criteria relates to an employee's state of mind. He must 
'honestly believe' that by carrying out management's order he would 
2
 Labour Gazette, volume 44, part 2, 1944, pp. 362-372. 
3
 The two main sources for this study are Labour Arbitration Cases (January, 
1954 to October, 1976) and Western Labour Arbitration Cases (January, 1967 to October, 
1976). Approximately fifty cases were reported. Relevant cases are also reported in 
sources such as: C. C. H., Labour Arbitration News, Sentences Arbitrâtes de Griefs, 
U.S. arbitration reports as well as court case reports. A systematic study would include 
such addition sources as well as unreported cases. Nevertheless, Labour Arbitration 
Cases appears to be the preferred source amongst Canadian arbitrators. This limited 
study should reflect the dominant tendency in the area concerned. 
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be exposing himself to serious harm. Certain information may be avail-
able to assist the arbitrator with his évaluation but, in essence, a 
personality assessment is made. This practice may resuit in an extra 
burden being placed upon the employée in question. For example, an 
arbitrator's préférence for 'respectable' life styles or the 'correct' social 
values may affect his judgement. In one case, where an employée 
refused to perform work on médical grounds J. D. O'Shea, Q. C. 
observed: 
«There was some indication that the company's objection to the 
grievor's long hair might hâve contributed to the company's refusal to 
accept the grievor's word concerning the alleged health hazard...» 
He then revealed his own beliefs : 
«While long hair was initially adopted by the original hippies as 
a sign of social dissent, in récent years the wearing of long hair by 
maies has often been adopted as part of the uniform of the immature. 
While this évidence of immaturity may tend to raise suspicion it is not 
in itself sufficient to give rise to disciplinaryaction...» (My emphasis) 
(Re United Automobile Workers, Local 636, and F.M.C. of Canada, 
Ltd., Link-Belt Speeder Division (1971) 23 L.A.C. 234 (O'Shea) at 
p. 239) 
By contrast, another arbitrator outlines a socially approved 
personality : 
«The grievor had worked four and one-half years without any 
previous disciplinary incidents. He gave his évidence in a straight-
forward and candid manner.... He was not an unduly timorous lad and 
was obviously used to hard, dirty, rugged work» 
(Re Steel Co. of Canada Ltd., and United Steelworkers, Local 1005 
(1973) 4. L.A.C. (2nd) 315 (Johnsont) at p.p. 321-22) 
Should an employée fail his initial credibility test he is open to 
employer discipline. If he passes further criteria must be satisfied. 
An employee's 'honest belief must be communicated, with some 
particularity, to management at the time when his refusal to work 
occurs. For example: 
« The Grievor did not indicate the nature of the unsafe conditions 
at the time of his refusal and the Company was within its rights to 
suspend him. The nature of the unsafe conditions should hâve been 
made clear in order for the company to remedy the situation.» 
(Re: B. C. Forrest Products Ltd. and Pulp and Paper Workers of 
Canada, Local 2 (1967) W. L. A. C. 67/201 (Herbert) at p.p. 67/20/202) 
It is not apparent, from the cases studied, how detailed an em-
ployee's explanation must be. The formalistic approach of most arbi-
tration boards suggests, however, he should be as explicit and précise 
as possible. 
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Honest belief, properly communicated must also be based on 
objective data. Thus, the arbitrator détermines which objective data are 
relevant in the case. Next, the data must be of a nature, such thaï, when 
viewed by other reasonable persons it would produce a similar response. 
The 'reasonableness' of an employée's response may involve assessing 
the history of a particular task as well as the actions of his workmates 
at the time of the incident. In a case where an employée refused to 
remove overhead débris from an open hearth checker chamber, the 
arbitrator took into considération the fact that : 
«.... the practice of poking checkers from below was a régulai 
though not fréquent, one for at least 20 years... and it had never 
produced another incident similar to the one herein tested. » 
In addition he noted : 
«Another way of testing the reasonableness of apprehended 
danger is to ask how the other crew members reacted to the same 
circumstances. » 
(Johnston 1973, at p. 318) 
Hence, an employée's refusai may be judged unreasonable if the 
task has an accident free history or if fellow employées do not express 
similar concern. To some extent, considération of the first factor may 
be justified. Given the existing management-employée power relation-
ship and the low level of hazard awareness, there is little justification 
for the second. 
Finally, the employée must prove that «the danger was sufiicient-
ly serious to justify the particular action he took. » 
(Johnston, 1973, p. 318) 
Ail jobs contain some degree of risk. At what stage does the risk 
involved justify the refusai to perform a spécifie task? More importantly, 
how does the arbitrator arrive at an acceptable level of risk. Perhaps 
existing fatality or injury fréquences by industry are used to arrive at 
acceptable or normal risk levels. If so, the arbitrator may simply be 
giving approval to patterns which never hâve been acceptable to the 
employées in question. The cases studied were ail silent on this crucial 
problem. 
Some arbitrators hâve also insisted that an employée must remain 
at the job site after his refusai, and that he must accept other work 
assigned to him.4 If the task is found to be hazardous, the employée 
may still suffer a loss of pay. Arbitrators generally hold that: 
« While breach of such an obligation may hâve, among its ultimate 
results, the effect of depriving employées of work, we would not say that 
4
 Re: Domtar Chemicals Ltd. and International Chemical Workers Union, 
Local 682 (1975) 8 L.A.C. 346 (Weatherill) at p. 348. 
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the remedy for such a breach was intended to be payment of damages 
to such employées for loss of earnings. » 
(Re Domtar Chemicals ltd. and International Chemical Workers 
Union, Local 682 (1975) 8 L.A.C. (2nd) 346 (Weatherill) at p. 349) 
In summary, an employée refusing to perform a hazardous task 
must satisfy at least the following conditions. 
(1) He must honestly believe the task in question is hazardous. 
(2) He must communicate his belief, with some particularity, to 
management at the time of his refusal. 
(3) Honest belief must be supported by objective data. 
(4) The task in question must be unusually hazardous. 
At ail times the onus of proof rests on the employée. It is difficult 
not to conclude that, from an employée's viewpoint, arbitrators hâve 
developed criteria which are unnecessarily restrictive. Récent législative 
developments5 may offer some relief. At présent, employées attempting 
to exercise their right to self-preservation face formidable obstacles.6 
5
 In 1973 Saskatchewan ammended its Labour Standards Act, thereby granting 
employées a statutory right to refuse to perform unusually dangerous work. Ontario, 
responding perhaps to the Royal Commission on the Health and Safety of Workers in 
Mines as well as several well publicized Asbestos related incidents passed Bill 139 in 
December of 1976. The Employées' Health and Safety Act, 1976 states in Section 2. 
« Where an employée in a work place has reasonable cause to believe that a machine, 
device, or thing is unsafe to use or operate because its use or opération is likely to 
endanger himself or another employée or a place in or about a work place is unsafe 
for him to work in, or the machine, device, thing or place is in contravention of The 
Industrial Safety Act, 1971, The Construction Safety Act, 1973 or Part IX of the Mining 
Act, or any régulations thereunder, as the case may be, the employée may refuse to use 
or operate the machine, device, or thing, or work in the place.» Section 3 (2) seems 
however to modify that right, since an employée «may continue to refuse to use or 
operate the machine, device or thing, or work in the place unless a collective agreement 
binding the employée expressly provides otherwise.» 
The Fédéral Government is also preparing a similar provision. Labor Minister 
John Munro recently said: «I believe it is essential that employées not be required to 
work at processes or places which they believe to be inherently unsafe or unhealthy.» 
(The Globe and Mail, March 29, 1977) 
Alberta's Occupational Health and Safety Act in Section 27 (1) (a) states: 
«no worker shall carry out any work where there exists an imminent danger to the 
health or safety of that worker. » The gênerai and ambiquous nature of such législative 
protection means that the courts will détermine the rules under which an employee's 
right may be exercised. Employées would be unwise to expect much relief from that 
direction. Additionally, an employee's right may be further restricted by existing 
législative provisions against work stoppages. Common to ail jurisdictions except 
Saskatchewan's. Section 49 (1) of the Alberta Labour Act for example, states: strike 
includes — 
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(1) a cessation of work, or 
(2) a refusai to work, or 
(3) a refusai to continue to work, 
by two or more employées acting in combination or in concert or in accordance with a 
common understanding for the purpose of compelling their employer or an employer's 
organization to agrée to terms or conditions of employment or to aid other employées 
to compel their employer or an employer's organization to accept terms or conditions of 
employment. 
6
 N.D.L.R. En milieu québécois, la règle du «Obey Now, Grieve Later» 
retient de moins en moins l'attention des arbitres de griefs à titre de solution de prin-
cipe. Le lecteur pourra consulter à ce sujet trois décisions où une étude jurispruden-
tielle exhaustive est faite: Syndicat national des employés de l'Université de Montréal, 
(1974) S.A.G. 1625; Syndicat canadien de la fonction publique et Commission scolaire 
de l'île Perrot, R.S.E., S. A. 0292, vol. 020 à 0300, p. 339. Cité de Charlesbourg et 
Fraternité des policiers-pompiers de la Cité de Charlesbourg, (1975) S.A.G. 661. Selon 
cette nouvelle approche, un salarié pourrait refuser d'obéir à un ordre reçu dès lors 
qu'il estime que cet ordre est contraire aux dispositions de la convention collective. 
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